{"id":2123,"date":"2011-05-20T11:58:12","date_gmt":"2011-05-20T11:58:12","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.faceofmalawi.com\/?p=2123"},"modified":"2011-05-20T11:58:12","modified_gmt":"2011-05-20T11:58:12","slug":"the-malawi-smallholder-farmer-maize-economy-is-farm-input-subsidy-enough","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.faceofmalawi.com\/index.php\/2011\/05\/20\/the-malawi-smallholder-farmer-maize-economy-is-farm-input-subsidy-enough\/","title":{"rendered":"The Malawi Smallholder Farmer Maize Economy: Is Farm Input Subsidy Enough?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<div>\n<div><strong><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignleft size-medium wp-image-2147\" title=\"smallholder\" src=\"http:\/\/www.faceofmalawi.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2011\/05\/smallholder-300x225.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"225\" \/>1.1\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The Malawi smallholder farmer maize economy<\/strong><\/div>\n<div>Malawi is a landlocked country in the southern Africa  with about 13.1 million people. Its economy is heavily dependent on  agriculture, which employs 78 per cent of the national labour force (Republic of Malawi,  2009). Maize is grown by 97 per cent of the farmers mostly (if not all)  grown without irrigation in the single annual rainy season (October to  April) and accounts for 60 per cent of total calorie consumption. This  therefore, means that maize is at the centre of Malawi\u2019s economy both as a major economic activity for the majority of the Malawians as well as for national food security.<\/div>\n<div>As a cereal crop, maize\u2019s productivity and production in Malawi  have over time varied directly with the national fertilizer  availability and use in the maize crop production. This was recognize  very early in Malawi\u2019s  agriculture history and soon after independence the Malawi Government  established a smallholder farmer support system mostly targeting the  maize sub-sector. The support package included:<\/div>\n<div>1.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Establishment and support to the national agricultural research stations for breeding new maize varieties,<\/div>\n<div>2.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Establishment and support to the national agricultural extension services to farmers,<\/div>\n<div>3.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Provision of subsidies on agricultural credit and imported farm inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides and seeds,<\/div>\n<div>4.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Establishment and maintenance of smallholder irrigation facilities for food production,<\/div>\n<div>5.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Creation  and management of Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation  (ADMARC), as an official state agricultural marketing board for small  farmers\u2019 inputs and outputs,<\/div>\n<div>6.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Establishment  and management of the national strategic grain reserves to act as  national buffer stocks and also for consumer price control,<\/div>\n<div>As with most SSA countries, Malawi  adopted the structural adjustment programme. In 1990, the World Bank  pushed the Government of Malawi to eliminate fertilizer subsidies  entirely with the theoretical premise that national food security could  better be achieved by farmers shifting to growing cash crops for export  and then using the export earnings to import food. The subsidies were  eliminated in phases and were completely abolished in 1995. This  essentially meant that the imported chemical fertilizer has to be  purchased at full commercial market price. With subsequent reforms in  the financial sector, chiefly, the floatation and massive devaluation of  the local currency (Malawi Kwacha) against the US Dollar and other  major international currencies, the local market price of the imported  fertilizers tripled between 1997 and 1998. As a result a majority of the  smallholder farmers could not afford, access and use the fertilizers in  their maize crop production. The period between the official complete  abolishment of fertilizer subsidies (that is 1995), and official  re-introduction of fertilizer subsidies (that is, 2006), was  characterized by absence of significant fertilizer use, depleted soil  nutrients particularly, Nitrogen (Sanches, 2002; Republic of Malawi,  2006), low national average maize yield of 1.3 tons per hectare,  negative national maize food grain balance sheets with over half of the  national farming households operating below subsistence (Republic of  Malawi, 2006). The national food supply security was characterised by  recurrent nation-wide food deficits and appeals for food aid. The same  period saw an influx of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) setting up  and implementing a multitude of different relief interventions in  different parts of the country often as reactive responses to annual  food deficits and hunger. These efforts, however, only managed to make  the food poverty \u201cwarm\u201d.<\/div>\n<div>In part response to the endemic food crises, the government of Malawi  in 1998\/1999 crop season introduced the universal Starter Pack Scheme  (SPS) to improve food production. Under this scheme, 2.8 million  smallholder farmers were given free packages<a href=\"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/post-create.g?blogID=7658030544415131009#_ftn1\">[1]<\/a> of seeds and fertilizers just enough for 0.1 hectare of farmland per  farming household. This resulted in national surplus of 420, 000 tons of  maize. The SPS programme was repeated in the 1999\/2000 crop season and  yielded a surplus of 280, 000 tons of maize grain. The SPS programme  was, however, modified starting with the 2000\/2001 crop season by a  condition of targeting specific poor farmers and it was renamed Targeted  Input Programme (TIP). Consequently, in the seasons between 2000\/2001  to 2004\/05 the number of smallholder farmers participating in the TIP  reduced and ranged between one\u00a0and two million. Unlike the SPS, the TIP  produced no surpluses and instead, Malawi  experienced some deficits in maize food. Part of the explanation could  be that the reduced number of beneficiaries effectively reduced the  quantity of fertilizers used in maize production, hence low yields and  output. The severity of hunger grew with better and more stringent TIP  Programme targeting and it reached its climax in 2005 when the Malawi  Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC) estimated that up to 38 per  cent of the Malawi  population required food aid. In this year, national maize yield  averaged 0.76 ton per hectare, 40 per cent below long term average, and  maize production was only 57 per cent of the national requirement. To  fill the gap, the government of Malawi  with assistance from its cooperating partners imported maize grain to  the cost of US$110 million. Including the cost of TIP Programme and  massive NGO activity, the total donor aid to Malawi in the same year (2005) was US$578 million (Malawi Governmet, 2006).<\/div>\n<div><strong>1.2\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The Malawi Farm Input Subsidy (FIS) Programme<\/strong><\/div>\n<div>Despite  adverse reactions and objections from some of its key cooperating  partners, the Government of Malawi adopted a policy reversal to the old  Farm Input Subsidy (FIS) Programme starting 2005\/06 cropping season. In  this programme Government distributed 3.4 million coupons to poor  smallholder farmers that enabled the participating farmer pay only  MK2,050 (US$16.40) for the market price of MK5,500 (US$44.00) per 50kg  bag of fertilizer \u00a0representing a 63 per cent subsidy. \u00a0A  total of 320, 000 tons fertilizer and 6,000 tons of improved seed were  distributed to a total cost of MK7.2 billion (US$58 million)  representing direct cost of purchasing and distribution. With this level  of investment, national average maize yield increased more than double  from 0.76 ton per hectare to 1.59 ton per hectare from 2004\/2005 to  2005\/2006 crop seasons, respectively. The same increase was reported for  national maize production from 1.23 million tons to 2.58 million tons,  translating into 510,000 tons of maize national surplus. In the  subsequent season (2006\/2007), the number of fertilizer subsidy coupons  were increased from 3.4 million to 3.5 million and in addition two  million maize seed coupons (each for 2kg of hybrid seed or 3kg OPV seed)  were also distributed. This investment resulted in maize yield increase  from a national average of 1.59 ton per hectare in 2005\/2006 crop  season to 2.04 ton per hectare in the 2006\/2007 crop season. This push  total maize production from 2.58 million tons to 3.44 million tons in  the same period. In this year, Malawi exported over 300,000 tons of  surplus maize to neighbouring countries including Zimbabwe, generating  foreign currency revenue to the tune of US$120 million against the total  programme cost for the 2006\/2007 season of US$72 million (Dorward et  al., 2008). Apart from earning foreign exchange revenue, export of  surplus maize enabled Malawi to contribute to the regional food security.<\/div>\n<div><strong>1.3\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Is Farm Input Subsidy Enough?<\/strong><\/div>\n<div>Definitely  not! The Malawi FIS Programme is vulnerable to many external risks and  still has internal challenges. Main external threats are two: rainfall  dependency and fertilizer import dependency. The first one is the fact  that since almost 100 percent of Malawi maize production is rain-fed,  any serious drought\u00a0potentially undercuts the investment in, and  anticipated gains from the FIS Programme. Secondly, any rapid rises in  the landed cost of fertilizers in Malawi  (a landlocked country) may entail a big budget shortfall that may lead  to downscaling the number of participants or level of subsidy per FIS  participant. Internally, Doward et al. (2010) noted in the evaluation  report of the 2009\/2010 FIS Programme that the Programme seems not to  have clear criteria for determining the number of, and for selecting,  the programme participants. This in part creates uncertainity on the  part of beneficiaries as they will not know with certainty whether they  will be eligible or not to receive the subsidy coupons. This has led to a  lot of chaos during the distribution of coupons and purchase of  fertilizers with so many people arrested each year including senior  government officers and local leaders. Again, while at macro-level, much  gain has been registered, at micro-level, not all the programme  participants benefit despite receiving the\u00a0FIS coupon due to the fact  that they poorest of the poor (who are the official target group-the  elderly, orphaned children, disabled) often lack labour a  critical\u00a0complementary maize production input.<\/div>\n<div><strong>1.4\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 What next?<\/strong><\/div>\n<div>Removal  of subsidy will be a political suicide of any Malawian leader who  attempts to do so. The best way forward is to continue improving on the  design. Cognizant of the above challenges,\u00a0there is\u00a0therefore, need  to\u00a0devise a model for determining a) the economically appropriate rate  of subsidy per FIS participant and length of stay in the FIS Programme,  b) targeting farmers with potential to succeed in the FIS, and c)  incentive package for motivating graduation of successful farmers out of  FIS Programme.<\/div>\n<p>Due to its  political momentum,\u00a0the FIS\u00a0Programme has reduced both the policy and  energy of Ministry of Agriculture to FOOD SECURITY, specifically, MAIZE.  Of course it is justifiable considering that 97 percent of the farmers  are engaged in maize production. However, Ministry of Agriculture has a  broader role than just food security. The tobacco, sugar,\u00a0tea, cotton,  rice, ground nuts, livestock, fisheries, horticulture development  equally need a strategy for support. Otherwise, the maize bias\u00a0will risk  turning the country into a maize economy while losing on the potential  national and regional markets for the other commodities.<\/p>\n<p>Ultimately, Malawi  should aim at creating commodity geographical zones based on  agro-ecological potential and develop comprehensive development plans  including human resource, equipment, capital, markets, and related  infrastructure, policies and institutions.<\/p>\n<p>Proper assessment  and surveillance of the internal, regional and international market will  be a key pre-liquisite input into the Comprehensive Plan.<\/p>\n<p>Key to this  Comprehensive Plan will be nurturing development and growth of small,  medium and large entreprenuers in the commodity value chain with  financing terms that accommodate for entrepreneurial learning and  long-term private investments in irrigation.<\/p>\n<p>The government will  have to invest in few but clearly identified and beneficial research  while exploiting research opportunities availed by the CGIARs and other  regional commodty-specific research orgaizations. The identification of  government funded research priorities should closely engage commodity  value chain actors through their institutions.<\/p>\n<p>Work with the  Regional Economic Integration Community (COMESA, SADC) towards a unified  regional agricultural policy while\u00a0aligning both national and regional  agricultural policy\u00a0to the African Union&#8217;s Framewok of CAADP. In  addition to creating trade space for regional commodties, the unified  policy will also be important in strengthening leverage of the bloc in  the WTO and other extra-regional trade negotiations including climate  change.<\/p>\n<hr size=\"1\" \/>\n<div>\n<div>\n<div><a href=\"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/post-create.g?blogID=7658030544415131009#_ftnref1\">[1]<\/a> The  SPS and TIP package comprised 10kg NPK fertilizer, 5kg Urea with 2kg  hybrid maize seed or 8kg rice seed, plus 1kg each of ground nuts, beans,  soya beans, and pigeon peas depending on the part of the country.<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<p>Posted by Solomon Mkumbwa<abbr title=\"2011-05-20T04:38:00-07:00\"><br \/>\n<\/abbr><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>1.1\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The Malawi smallholder farmer maize economy Malawi is a landlocked country in the southern Africa with about 13.1 million [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":2147,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[230],"tags":[573,574,464,575],"class_list":["post-2123","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-agriculture","tag-economy","tag-farmer","tag-maize","tag-smallholder-farmer"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.faceofmalawi.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2123","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.faceofmalawi.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.faceofmalawi.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.faceofmalawi.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.faceofmalawi.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2123"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.faceofmalawi.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2123\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.faceofmalawi.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.faceofmalawi.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2123"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.faceofmalawi.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2123"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.faceofmalawi.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2123"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}